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TRADING BEHAVIOR AND ASSET PRICING UNDER HETEROGENEOUS EXPECTATIONS R. Agus Sartono
This research models trading behavior and examines the impact of heterogeneous expectations on asset prices. We extend Kyle's (1985) 
one-period model to two-period model. The model shows that the informed trader takes into account not only the private information but also the pricing function. The price is an increasing function of the volatility of the asset value and decreasing in the volatility of uninformed traders' demand. The costly information acquisition has an impact on the optimum demand but it has no direct impact on the price. We find the market depth is a linear function of the volatility of the uninformed traders and a weighted average of the total error variance of information. The depth is also decreasing in the volatility of the cash flow innovations. This argument is in line with the second finding, when the volatility of cash flow innovations increases, the value of risky asset becomes more volatile, and as a result the bigger are the advantages of having private information. Our research raises some questions for further investigation. We indirectly assume that the informed traders make a profit at the expense on the uninformed traders. The question is why the uninformed traders willing to face losses? What happen if there are n informed traders who have diverse information?
Research Background
Homogeneous expectations, costfree information and risk aversion are crucial assumptions underlying the capital asset pricing model, hereafter called CAPM. As the standard model of financial markets, the CAPM assumes homogeneous probability expectations:
1 individuals have the same information, interpret it in the same manner and draw the same conclusions. However, in the real market, even when individuals have the same information, they will most likely analyze and interpret it in different ways and come up with different conclusions. Empirical studies of the CAPM are typically characterized by the assumption of mean variance expectations derived from historical data and risk-averse traders. Roll (1977) raised some serious questions about the validity of the homogeneous expectation assumption and the testability of the CAPM. A valid test requires complete knowledge of the composition of the true market portfolio. This implies that all assets must be included in the test. Despite its many critics, the CAPM has drawn a great deal of attention from practitioners as well as academic communities within the last three decades. The CAPM has proved to be a preferable approach for pricing assets
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) has become another major debate subject among academics and financial professionals in the last three decades. The EMH states that a market is said to be informationally efficient if at any given time, security prices fully reflect all available information and the actual price of a security is a good estimate of its intrinsic value (Fama 1970) . Thus, in an informationally efficient market it is impossible to make profits on the basis of public and private information. In reality, the markets are neither efficient nor completely inefficient. All markets are efficient to a certain extent and some more so than others.
The empirical studies indicate that there are quite a lot of anomalies such as size effect, end-of-the-year effect, price-to-book ratio effect, and price reversal that can not be justified by the EMH.
2 There is continuing disagree- 1 The models of both William F. Sharpe (1964) and John Lintner (1965) assumed that agents agree on mean and variance and the only risk that should be compensated is the systematic risk which can not be eliminated by diversifying investment in the portfolio. Heterogeneous belief or divergence opinion is used with the same purpose as heterogeneous expectations. It captures how traders collect, analyze and interpret different information about fundamental value of assets differently.
2 For more details, here is a short list of some anomalies: dividend cut and omissions (Michaely et al. 1995) ; stock repurchase (Lakonishok and Vermaelen 1990) ; stock return and weekend effect (French 1980) ; book to market value equity (Fama and French 1992) ; the January effect (Rozeff and Kinney 1976; and Keim 1983) ; size effect (Banz 1981, and Reinganum 1983) ; P/E effect (Basu 1977) ; price reversal (DeBondt and Thaler 1985, and Jegadesh and Titman 1993) ; and equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott 1985) . ment as to whether the different anomalies indicate that the market is inefficient or whether the anomalies stem from a mathematical modeling problem, a sampling error, or misinterpretation and misuse by practitioners and researchers. Fama (1991) admits that zero information cost is a necessary condition for an efficient market. Since information is cost-free, traders are assumed to have the same information, and the price system leads to perfect aggregation of information. Whenever prices perfectly aggregate all information, private information is useless and traders could infer information from the prices.
If this is the case, there is no reason for traders to spend a single euro to get additional information. If all available information is reflected in the asset prices, there is no incentive for information acquisition. Grossman (1976) argues that the cost-free information is not only a sufficient, but also a necessary condition. In another paper, Grossman and Stigliz (1976, 1980) and Grossman (1978) argue that the capital market can not even begin to be informationally efficient if the acquisition of information is costly.
The main point of the argument is that under the costly information assumption, if prices fully reveal all information, traders may not be able to earn a return on their investment in information. If the price system is a perfect aggregator of information, it eliminates the private incentive to collect information. All traders prefer to obtain the available information at no cost by inferring it from the market prices rather than by acquiring it directly at cost. If there is no incentive for information gathering, the perfect competitive market will break down; there is no equilibrium since no one collects costly information. If no one collects the information, how can prices reflect the information; and the prices will not reveal all the information. Then some traders may realize that they would be better-off if they were better informed. In equilibrium, the price must contain noise, a disturbance that prevents traders from learning all the information from the price and provides incentive for information acquisition. Informed traders can then hide and maximize their advantage of having private information. Otherwise, the markets break down.
In a competitive market, if traders have heterogeneous information, then their demand for risky asset may reveal or partially reveal their information. As in Grossman's (1976) model with two types of risk-averse informed and uninformed traders, if the price is high then the uninformed can infer that this may be due to the informed traders having good news regarding the expected payoff of assets. But whenever the price is low, this implies that informed traders possibly just received bad news. Assuming that all traders are rational, price is a sufficient statistic for all the signals observed by traders. Knowing the equilibrium price is the same as observing all the information, and private information is useless. This argument enhances the para-dox that price can incorporate the traders' information only if traders take it into account in determining their demand. Meanwhile, if they know the equilibrium price, they will disregard their information in favor of the equilibrium price. Hellwig (1980) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) attempted to solve the asset pricing paradox by introducing the supply of risky assets and liquidity traders as random variables. Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) consider the random supply of risky assets as noise. If the supply is uncertain, then the high price could be due to favorable information or the low supply of risky assets. Price will no longer be perfectly informative, and traders should take into account their own information as well as the price. Kyle (1985) proved that when traders take into account the effect of their own demands on price, the price is not fully revealing. It thus provides incentive for costly information gathering even if traders are risk-neutral.
Purpose of the Study and Research Question
Investors or traders spend millions of euros to gain access to the increasingly sophisticated forecasting services of professional security analysts, who provide earnings forecasts and statistical analyzes on a firm-byfirm basis. An analysis can be yearly or quarterly, for an individual company or for an entire industry. Information is costly, and the main objective in acquiring costly information is to have better assessment of assets value. Traders gather, analyze and interpret information differently, so they end up with different beliefs regarding the future pay off or cash flow of assets. Different beliefs lead to different or heterogeneous expectations.
The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of heterogeneous expectations on the asset price. Assuming that the market is somewhat inefficient and that the prices do not fully reflect all the available information, being better informed should yield a higher return. We will extend the oneperiod Kyle (1985) model to a twoperiod model in an attempt to find solutions for asymmetric information in asset pricing. We expect that our result will answer the Grossman Paradox to some extend. Using Kyle's (1985) framework, we will focus on the strategic action of an informed trader who has better information than uninformed traders. Information is costly and traders are assumed to be risk-neutral, so there will be no risk sharing problems among traders and there must be incentives for traders who choose to be informed. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) suggest there are informed traders, uninformed traders, and liquidity traders. The informed traders have private information about cash flow innovations, but they have different error variance of private information. The main intention is to see whether the diverse information that presumably leads to heterogeneous expectations has an impact on the optimum demand for risky assets. They focus on the dynamic strategic behavior of informed and liquidity traders. Informed traders have private information on the realization value of assets, but the liquidity traders do not have such information. The liquidity traders fall into two categories, discretionary liquidity traders, who use their own discretion in timing trades, and non-discretionary liquidity traders, who do not have discretion in timing.
The informed trader has lower error variance of private information than the uninformed trader. The informed traders are those who have special knowledge about cash flow innovations, and who spent a lot of effort and resources to gather and analyze information. On the other hand, the uninformed traders are those who have no special knowledge about cash flow innovations, and who make no effort to gather and analyze information. In our scenario, we simply assume that there are constant flows of uninformed traders coming into the market. Having a large number of uninformed traders in the market creates camouflage for informed traders' private information. Thus, when some uninformed traders leave the market, the other uninformed or liquidity traders just enter the market. That is true of the real world, where some numbers of rational traders leave the market and are replaced by other traders. Grossman (1976) and Kyle (1985) indirectly assumed that the uninformed traders can not buy the market portfolio. That is why they lose to trade with the informed traders. If the uninformed traders can buy the market portfolio, they are guaranteed to earn the average return.
In fact, traders do spend a lot of money to gather information. They do interpret and analyze in different ways, because they have different information processing capacity. As a result they have different beliefs and heterogeneous expectations regarding assets value. The main question then, does the private information have an impact on the equilibrium asset price? How the price behaves in the equilibrium using an extended two-period model? Do the heterogeneous expectations, as measured by different error variances of private information, have an impact on the demand for risky assets? These questions are at the center of this research. We intend to answer these questions by building a mathematical model. Lintner (1969) raised the issue of heterogeneous expectations, and traders are assumed to be risk-averse. He proposed a model in which traders have a different assessment of expected price and covariance. When expected futures prices differ among traders, each trader will hold different optimal portfolios and different fractions of the portfolio. The pricing system takes the weighted average of traders' portfolio. The expected mar-ket prices are a complex weighted average of individuals' assessment. In a purely competitive market, the price system necessarily and automatically uses the ideal weight in combining the separate vector assessment of expected price of each individual into its composite market estimate price. The best composite estimate price, the market's composite risk aversion and its composite covariance assessment together determine the market prices. Thus, the pricing system aggregates the individuals' heterogeneous assessment of future price and covariance into a single market price.
Brief Overview of Previous Studies
It is Kyle (1985) who starts developing the asset price under asymmetric information. He assumes there is one risk-neutral insider or informed trader, market makers, and noise traders. The market maker knows only the sum of the demands of the informed and noise traders, but does not know them individually, and uses this information to set the market price and then take a position to clear the market. It is assumed that market making is a perfectly competitive profession, so that the market makers set the price such that, given the total order, their profit at the end of the period is expected to be zero. The price is a linear function of the total order flows. Kyle proved that insider, as an informed trader, makes a positive profit by exploiting his power monopoly optimally in a dynamic context, where noise trading provides camouflage, which cancels his trading from market makers. To simplify the analysis, the noise traders are assumed to be the same as uninformed noise traders. 3 In this model, the informed trader is assumed to be risk-neutral who maximize the expected profit. The price determined by the market maker is assumed to be equal to the expectation of the liquidation value condition on the market maker's information set. Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) extended the one-period Kyle model to a two-period model. They focused on the behavior of uninformed traders in an attempt to minimize loss trading with informed traders. In the first period the company sells share in exchange for capital. Some uninformed traders face liquidity needs, become early consumers and have to trade, while the rest remain as late consumers. With the existence of forward markets, the early consumers can sell their share forward to fulfill their cash problem. The fully rational uninformed traders can create composite securities to minimize their loss. In other papers, Grossman (1976) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) showed how the heterogeneous information of different traders can be reflected on the equilibrium price of security. Using two types of traders who are informed and uninformed, they demonstrated how the price system transmits information from informed to uninformed traders. Nevertheless, if the price system aggregates perfectly private information, then it eliminates the incentive for traders to collect information.
In another attempt to model the costly information on asset price, Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) introduced noise by assuming that traders have an initial random endowment of the asset. If the supply to rational traders is not known with certainty, then a high price could be either the consequence of traders receiving favorable signals or the effect of low supply. Price is no longer perfectly informative about the traders' information set, and so each trader will base his belief about the likely outcome on both price and his own piece of information. Jackson (1991) analyzed the equilibrium, price formation and the value of private information. He showed that if the price formation process is modeled explicitly and traders are not price takers, then it is possible to have equilibrium with fully revealing prices and costly information acquisition. He used a similar model as Grossman (1976) with two types of traders but under the assumption of risk-neutral traders. He dropped the price taking assumption, because it is impossible to have a fully revealing price if information acquisition is costly. Equilibrium in costly information acquisition is ex ante Pareto inefficient, since resources are lost in the acquisition of information. In his setting, information is only important in determining the distribution of wealth among identical risk-neutral traders; therefore, it is not surprising that costly information acquisition is inefficient. He proved that if the price formation is explicit and traders influence the prices, then it is possible to have fully revealing prices. Jackson and Peck (1997) examined price formation in a simple static model with asymmetric information and the advantage of being informed traders. They showed that with costly information acquisition, the price exhibits a "V" shape as a function of the cost of information. When all traders are either informed or uninformed, the price is highest, and lower when only some traders are informed. They built a model in which there is an infinite number of traders. Thus, the price formation is competitive and no single trader can influence the price. The rationale of the "V" shape of expected prices is straightforward; when the cost of information acquisition is low, everyone chooses to be informed; but as the information cost increases, the fraction of informed traders decreases. When the information cost exceeds the maximum potential benefit from being informed, no one chooses to be informed. The benefit of being informed at the beginning declines as the number of informed traders increases and at some point the benefit of being informed increases. William (1977) introduced an alternative model in pricing capital assets under heterogeneous beliefs and risk-aversion. Using his model, he proved that beta is no longer a complete measure of risk. Figlewski (1982) proved that information level or diversity will affect investors' beliefs or expectations. Thus, different investors may acquire different information, process it in different ways and respond differently. In another study based on a computer simulation model, Schredelseker (1997) developed a model that indicates that information does have a negative value and does not supports the empirical evidence that investors are willing to spend a lot of money to get better information in advance. He makes an experimental simulation using n laplace-coins in a one-period pure exchange economy with one security traded and shows that the information level affects the gain and losses on the transaction. For a less informed trader it is rational to switch from an active to a passive investment strategy, and in a market that is less than perfectly efficient it pays to be very well informed.
Importance and the Uniqueness of this Study
The current study is important because to date not much research has been done on this issue. In this study, we take directly into our model the information cost and we assume that traders are risk-neutral. In our premise, the market is somewhat inefficient and there must be a reason for traders to spend a large amount of money on information. Information must have an economic value, and it must be worth being better informed traders. The result possibly solves the equity premium puzzle and enhances assetpricing in the asymmetric information.
Research Method and Modeling
The previous part presented the literature review as well as the empirical research related to the heterogeneous expectations and asset price. This part will analyze the mathematical model. Let us begin with the assumption, followed by the solution of equilibrium price and finalized with implication and discussion. This research takes a similar approach as in Kyle (1985) ; the difference is that we extend the Kyle model into two periods with an informed risk-neutral trader and uninformed traders. We will make a two-period model in the secondary market and try to find out the impact of asymmetric information on the asset prices. The informed trader has private information about expected realization value of risky asset and has to trade at a price which does not yet reflect the information.
The Optimum Demand and Equilibrium Price Model setup
Suppose there is a risky asset in the market and there is a risk-neutral informed trader who has information about the expected realization value of a risky asset at the end of the first and second periods. There is a risk-neutral uninformed trader who has to trade for liquidity reasons or consumption shock. Let us assume that the time span is very short. Therefore, the expected realization value of risky asset in both periods is the same and there is no discounting problem. The informed trader demands a risky asset on the basis of private information that is not known to the other trader when the trade takes place.
The total order flow in the first period consists of the informed trader's order and the uninformed trader's order. The informed trader's strategy is to maximize profit given his private information. The total order flow in the second period comes from the informed trader and the uninformed trader as well. The crucial assumption is that the uninformed trader must not to lose money per se, and is restricted in his ability to buy the market portfolio and has no access to the financial market. Otherwise, it makes possible for him to earn at least as much as risk free rate (Kyle 1985) . If he has access to the financial market, he is able to use his security as collateral for a loan at a risk-free rate. This assumption is debatable since large institutional companies are able to get access to the financial market at very low interest rates.
4
The informed trader is not allowed to submit market order which is condition on the demand of the uninformed trader; nor is he allowed to submit a strategic untruthful order to the market maker. The informed trader will sell an asset and invest in another only if he has private information that the former asset is relatively overvalued at current market prices. This is a little bit different from the argument that prices are not fully revealing. As in Kyle's (1985) model, the demand for the risky asset rises, because the informed trader received good news or because there are large liquidity demands. The informed trader submits a market order given his private information to maximize the expected profit. The risk-neutral informed trader will purchase any amount of risky assets when the asset price equals the expectation of its fundamental value.
The two-period model is an extension of Kyle's (1985) model, where trading takes place in the first and second periods. The informed and uninformed traders submit market orders to the market makers in both periods as follows:
The informed trader has private information regarding the expected realization value of a risky asset in the two periods. Since the time span is assumed to be very short, the expected realization value would be the same, . We assume that the uninformed trader's order is independent of all other random variables, and hence nothing can be learned about the liquidation value of the asset from the uninformed trader's orders. The trading sequence can be seen in the Figure 1 .
Let us assume that the market makers determine the price at which they trade the quantity necessary to clear the market. As a competitive profession, the expected profit of market makers is zero. The asset price functions for both periods as standard (Kyle 1985) model is the linear function of the total order flows as follows:
Lambda measures how the market maker learns about the liquidation value of a risky asset from order flows. The market depth is measured by the reciprocal of  1 and  2 for the first and the second period, respectively. The depth refers to the ability of the market to absorb quantity without having a large impact on price. If a lambda is small, the market is said to be very liquid. It means that an increase in traders' demand has only small impact on the price. The profit maximization strategy of informed traders could be found using the backward induction approach, because a Bayesian Nash equilibrium requires equilibrium strategies to be optimal for each trader given the rational belief. Thus, the informed trader will maximize the value of his private information in both periods. Lemma 1: Within the structure above, the optimum demand of an informed trader in the first and the second period is as follows: 
We use the same backward approach to find the optimum demand of the informed trader in the first period. The informed trader acts strategically to optimize his superior information. Now let us substitute the optimum demand of the second period into the first period, and we know that the informed trader faces the same problem of maximizing his expected profit as follows:
Proof: Using the backward induction approach, 5 the optimum quantity order of an informed trader in the first period can be solved as follows: 
Now let us substitute Equation (6), the optimum order of the informed trader in the second period, into Equation (5) to find the optimum profit, as: Hirth (1999) provide an excellence example of how to use backward induction to find the optimum demand in a two-period model. In line with the Kyle (1985) approach, he focused on the insider trading and its effect on market liquidity and information efficiency. He proved that when the probability of an earlier publication date increases, the insider trades more and the price reflects more information, but the market liquidity decreases. Let us simplify by factoring the second term of Equation (8) Equation (11) shows that the optimum demand in the first period is a linear function of private information in the sense of the difference between the realization value of the risky asset and the current price. It is obvious that when the informed trader knows the realization value would be higher than the current price, v 1 > p 0 , he will demand the risky asset. The higher the difference between the realization value and the current price, the greater the demand of the informed trader would be. The informed trader not only takes advantage of his information, but also considers the market maker's pricing strategy in both periods as measured by lambda.
Market makers' pricing strategy
The market maker receives the market order from the informed and 
We found that the market depth in the second periods is similar to the Kyle' (1985) one-period model. However, we found that the depth in the first period is not straight forward, because lambda in the first period is a function of the lambda in the second periods and the first period as well. In the second periods, the depth is increasing function of the volatility of the uninformed trader and decreasing in the volatility of the risky asset. The market depth is measured by the reciprocal of lambda. It measures how the demand changes affect the price. The bigger the lambda is, the smaller the market depth would be. Thus, wheñ˜˜ the volatility of the uninformed trader's demand increases, the informed trader is better-off because he is able to disguise his private information from the price.
Equilibrium price under costly information
Up to this point, the information cost is not yet considered. Let us assume that the informed trader spends as much as c to acquire the information. Being better informed, his expected maximum profit presumably will increase and he will stop collecting the information until the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit of being informed. Assuming that the time span is very short, the interest rate between first and second period is zero. Therefore, the expected realization value of risky asset is the same in both periods, v Taking the first derivation in respect of x 2 and equating it to zero, we are able to find the optimum order of the informed trader in the second period as follows: 
The optimum order of the informed trader in the second period is not affected by the information cost. The information cost, c then disappears from the first derivation in respect of x 2 unless the information cost is a function of the number of shares or investment size. The argument is not quite logical if the information cost is a constant, regardless of the number of shares traded. The more plausible argument is that the larger the investment, the more likely traders will spend money on information to protect their investment. Therefore, the information cost must be a function of the number of shares traded or investment size. If it is true, then the information cost, c from Equation (19) must be within the bracket. Lemma 2: Under costly information acquisition as structured above, the optimum demand of the informed trader in the first and the second period is as follows: the investment in the sense of the demand for risky asset. It is true that the informed trader has to bear the information cost before submitting the order. But it is plausible to assume that a trader who has a large investment is willing to spend more for information than other traders who have a smaller investment. Using a similar approach we can find the optimum demand of the informed trader in the second period as follows:
The more detailed proof is omitted due to the very simple case and it can be solved by modifying the previous proof. The optimum order of the informed trader is a linear function of the information accuracy minus the information cost. The more accurate the information is, the larger the order of the informed trader will be. The informed trader will continue to collect the information as long as the information value is higher than the cost, (v Let us substitute Equation (22) into the optimization function in the first period; we know that the in the first period, the informed trader faces a similar profit maximization problem. As we assume that E[u 1 , u 2 ]= 0 and we are able to rearrange Equation (23) and solve for x 1 , the optimum order of the informed trader in the first period is as follows: (23) We can use the similar proof as in Lemma 1 to find the optimum demand in the first period. Thus, some steps were omitted.
Equations (21) and (24) show that the optimum demands of the informed trader decreases in the information cost. The market makers' pricing strat-( , no one will be willing to collect the private information. Proposition 2: Given the optimum demand in the first and the second period, the market maker set the pricing strategy as follows:
and Proof: We can use a similar approach to prove the above proposition.
Equations (21) and (24) We know that as in the Kyle (1985) model 1/2 =  and beta measures the aggressiveness of the informed trader. In the second period, the market depth -as measured by the reciprocal of lambda-is a linear function of the volatility of the uninformed trader and decreases in the volatility of the risky asset. The more volatile the uninformed trader in the market is, the more aggressive the informed trader would be. As we assume that the market maker sets up the price as a
Var (y 2 )˜˜˜ linear function of order flows; so, when the volatility of uninformed trader increases, the price become even less efficient and the depth increases. A similar approach can be applied to find lambda in the first period. Let us substitute the demand of the informed trader and the uninformed trader in the first period and solve for the variance of total order flows and covariance between the expected realization value of the risky asset in the first period and the total order flows. 
From Equation (29) we find that the market depth in the first period is a linear function of the variance of uninformed traders' demand and inversely related in the variance of the asset value. However, we are not able to find the closed form solution for lambda in the first period because the lambda in the first period is a function of the lambda in the first and the second periods. This problem is open for a further research. As in Kyle (1985) , lambda represents how the market maker learns about the liquidation value of the risky asset from the order flows. The reciprocal of lambda coefficient is interpreted as the market depth, which refers to the ability of the market to absorb quantity without having a large effect on price. If the lambda coefficient is small, then the market is very liquid. This means an increase in the trader's demand has only a small impact on the price.
The Implication and Discussion
Based on the Kyle models, we find that the market depth in the second period as measured by the reciprocal of lambda is a linear function of the uninformed traders and inversely related to the private information. The higher the information level, the better the estimate of asset value and the smaller the error would be. The market depth increases whenever the informed trader has better information in the sense that the informed trader knows the price does not yet reveal the expected realization value of risky asset. The informed trader has to trade immediately whenever he has private information that is not yet reflected in the price. Otherwise, his information become valueless.
From the uninformed traders' point of view, when the demand of the informed trader rises, the price risky asset becomes more efficient. It is because the informed trader has private information and has to take advantage of his information. The uninformed trader then able to infer the information better from the price and he is even more willing to trade. The increase in uninformed trader's demand provide an opportunity for the informed trader to camouflage the trade and hide his private information. However, we have a little bit difficulty to draw direct conclusion for the price behavior and the market depth in the first period since we do not have a close-simple form solution. We find that the market depth in the first period is affected by the market depth in the second period. This problem remains open for further research.
The Lemma 2, shows that the costly information acquisition has an impact on the optimum demand of the informed trader as long as the information cost is a linear function of investment size. But when we assume that the information cost is fixed, no matter the investment size is, the information cost does not affect the equilibrium demand. The question then, is it plausible to assume that the information cost is a linear function of investment size? We believe that the larger the investment is, the bigger the risk faced by trader would be. Therefore, trader willing to bear higher information cost to minimize the risk. The information cost can be defined in terms of money, time and effort to acquire and to analyze the information. This argument also supports the empirical evidence that institutional investors are willing to hire experts and analysts just to make any better valuation of the risky asset.
The optimum demand in the first period shows that the informed trader takes into account the pricing strategy in both periods as measured by lambda. It is plausible since the price of the risky asset in the second period, P 2 = p 1 +  2 (x + u) is a function of the price in the first period. The price in the first period becomes public knowledge and the price in the second period must reflect the private information of the informed trader in the second period. Lambda also indicates how the market maker adjusts the price to the changes of order flow. It is true that indirectly we are assume that the informed trader makes profit at the expense of uninformed trader. This argument may raise some doubt. However, we believe that in the market not all traders have access to the information and some of them do trade simply because they like it to do so or due to other reasons. Our model disserved to be tested empirically and open for further research.
Conclusion
In this research we model trading behavior and examine the impact of heterogeneous expectations on asset prices. We explore a market when informed traders have private information about the expected realization value of a risky asset. We extend Kyle's (1985) one-period model to ã two-period model. The optimum demand in the second period is similar to what have been shown in Kyle. In the first period, the optimum demand of the informed trader is a linear function of the private information as measured by the difference between the realization value of a risky asset and the current price, v 1 -p 0 . The informed trader takes into account not only the pricing function in the first period, but also the pricing function in the second period.
The price of risky asset is an increasing function of the volatility of the expected realization value, and it decreases in the volatility of the uninformed traders'demand. When we assume that the information cost is a function of investment size, we find that the costly information acquisition has an impact on the optimum demand of the informed trader. The information cost has indirect impact on the price behavior through the optimum demand of informed trader. It can be seen from lambda for both periods, that the information cost did not appear on the equations. In other words, market makers do not consider the information cost directly in setting the price. However, if we assume that the information cost is independent of the investment size, we do not find that the information cost does have an impact on the demand of the risky asset.
